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Note
Reconsidering Home Rule and City-State
Preemption in Abandoned Fields of Law
Franklin R. Guenthner∗
INTRODUCTION
Phoenix, Arizona, is stuck. In 2015, the city of over one million people 1 recognized the growing impact of climate change, 2
and the need for sound energy policy at a municipal level.3 Local
officials considered passing local energy benchmarking legislation, whereby buildings above a certain size would report their
energy consumption, allowing tenants to choose whether to support a building’s carbon footprint.4 Before lawmakers could even
propose the ordinance, however, the state legislature passed a
law prohibiting any city in the state, including Phoenix, from
passing such laws.5
∗ J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like
to thank Professor Myron Orfield for helping focus my initial ideas for this Note
through his teaching, and for coining the term abandoning the field. Thanks
also to Professor Kristin Hickman, Professor Christopher Soper, Hannah Nelson, Joe Janochoski, and Jacob Harksen for their feedback, the staff and editors
of Minnesota Law Review for their contributions, and my family for their support. Copyright  2017 by Franklin R. Guenthner.
1. QuickFacts: Phoenix city, Arizona, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www
.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/phoenixcityarizona/PST045216 (last updated
July 1, 2016).
2. For an overview of municipal contributions and responses to the growing climate crisis, see generally Harriet Bulkeley, Cities and the Governing of
Climate Change, 35 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES 229 (2010).
3. In a recent interview, the Mayor of Phoenix, Greg Stanton, explained
that “[c]limate change is affecting Phoenix, Arizona, as much as any other big
city in the United States of America right now[,] [n]ot in the future,” thus spurring the conversation for local laws that could tackle the problem. Henry Grabar, Phoenix Has Beef with Arizona, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2016) http://www.slate
.com/articles/business/metropolis/2016/09/phoenix_mayor_greg_stanton_is_
fed_up_with_arizona_pre_empting_his_city_s.html.
4. ASU ENERGY POLICY INNOVATION COUNCIL, ARIZONA’S PROHIBITION
ON REQUIREMENT OF ENERGY MEASURING AND REPORTING 1 (2015).
5. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.36 (2016). There is skepticism at the municipal level whether this bill has any motivations beyond the purely political.
Stanton believes that “[j]ust the conversation about adopting the policy spurred
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This practice—states passing laws that block local governments from enacting ordinances—is commonly referred to as
preemption, 6 and Phoenix is not the only city feeling its effects.
As large cities around the country comprise larger proportions of
their states’ populations, they face new challenges in climate
change and energy,7 paid sick leave, 8 LGBT rights,9 and access
to basic services, 10 to name a few. But rather than empower their
political subdivisions to tackle these issues on their own, the parent states of many cities are passing laws that prohibit them
from doing just that, 11 even where no state statutes on those issues may yet exist. 12 In North Carolina, the state legislature has
passed a series of laws that nullify a Charlotte ordinance banning LGBT discrimination and creating transgender bathroom
accommodations.13 In Minnesota, recent court decisions have
overturned municipal charter amendments to raise the minimum wage and require police officers to carry personal liability
the Legislature to ban cities from engaging in it.” Grabar, supra note 3. In other
words, the state bill was not motivated by the need to exact statewide policy.
The state simply prohibited the regulation and walked away. Arizona has yet
to pass similar legislation regarding even market-based energy bills like the
Phoenix ordinance.
6. See NICOLE DUPUIS ET AL., NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN
AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 3 (2017) (defining
preemption as “the use of state law to nullify a municipal ordinance or authority”).
7. See Grabar, supra note 3. The same law that prohibits energy benchmarking also prohibits municipalities from regulating the use of disposable
bags, in response to an attempt to pass a local ordinance in Tempe banning the
use of plastic bags in grocery and other retail stores. See Mike Sunnucks, Arizona Legislature Approves Ban on Plastic Bag Bans, Energy Mandates (Again),
PHX. BUS. J. (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/news/2016/
03/14/arizona-legislature-approves-ban-on-plastic-bag.html.
8. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., ORDINANCES, ch. 40, art. I–III (2016).
9. See Steve Harrison, Charlotte City Council Approves LGBT Protections
in 7–4 Vote, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www
.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article61786967.html.
10. See Alia Beard Rau, Republican Bill Would Halt Phoenix Plan to Issue
IDs to Undocumented Immigrants, Others, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 13, 2016),
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/politics/2016/01/13/legislation
-would-handcuff-phoenix-id-card-efforts/78748916/.html.
11. See DUPUIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 4 (mapping the numerous states
and wide range of areas of law where states currently preempt cities from acting).
12. See Grabar, supra note 3.
13. See 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 2017-4. The 2017 law repealed a 2016 statute
that also preempted all city ordinances regarding public accommodations, but
was more widely criticized for requirements it imposed on government restrooms. See 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 2016-3.
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insurance.14 And in Arizona, a new law is attempting to make
state preemption against all local legislation the status quo.
That law allows any legislator to propose to the Arizona Attorney
General that a local ordinance has violated state law. 15 If the
Attorney General agrees, that city loses its state funding for the
entire fiscal year.16
Preemption as a legislative tool is not a novel legal concept.
Just as the federal government can preempt state law that directly conflicts with it, 17 states have long been able to pass their
own uniform laws that bind all localities to one statewide policy. 18 The legal trend in the cities discussed above, however, has
been toward parent political bodies passing preemptive laws
without prescribing affirmative policies to replace the newly defunct ordinances, effectively abandoning the field of law and nullifying it at the local level. 19 The consequence is a signal to cities
across these states that they are powerless to find their own solutions to issues that directly impact them—and, in extreme
cases, to chill future local legislation altogether. 20
This Note explores the limits of city-state preemption when
states abandon the field in a particular area of law. Looking at
the city-state relationships outlined above in Arizona, Minnesota, and North Carolina, it argues that the traditional boundaries of local power need to be reconsidered in light of the evolving
challenges modern cities are facing. It also evaluates the legal
14. See Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, 887 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 2016) (per
curiam); Order Dismissing Petition, Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, No. 27-CV16-11839 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016); Order Dismissing Petition for Writ of
Mandamus, Mann v. Minneapolis City Council, No. 27-CV-13-13029 (Dist. Ct.
Minn. Nov. 12, 2013).
15. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01 (2016).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001) (citing
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992)) (reiterating that
“[s]tate action may be foreclosed by express language in a congressional enactment”).
18. As discussed in Part I, infra, city-state preemption became a matter of
federal constitutional law in the landmark decision of Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207
U.S. 161 (1907).
19. See, e.g., § 9-500.38 (prohibiting cities from imposing taxes or fees on
the use of disposable bags, but further prohibiting any legislation regarding the
use of reusable containers made out of various materials such as cloth, and not
proposing any positive policies to address environmental concerns raised in the
local bill that prompted the preemptive bill in the first place); see also Grabar,
supra note 3.
20. See Grabar, supra note 3 (discussing the “chilling effect” that preemptive laws have on “cities’ abilities to be laboratories of experimentation about
big public policy”).
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doctrine of home rule immunity and shows how constitutional
charter authority can shield cities from preemptive state legislation that does not itself demonstrate a legitimate state interest
in a preempted area of law. Part I outlines the history of home
rule amendments and the specific characteristics in them that
allow cities to be immune from certain state interference. Part II
analyzes the effectiveness of home rule immunity where a state
government has abandoned the field within the context of the
states listed above. Part III reexamines these examples to prescribe the legal framework that cities should advance in challenging various preemptive statutes. Ultimately, this Note proposes that, in home rule cities where state preemptive statutes
do not sufficiently demonstrate a pressing statewide concern
over areas of law already occupied at the local level, courts
should adopt a rebuttable presumption that the parent political
body has abandoned the field, and that local law controls.
I. TRACING THE HISTORY OF HOME RULE IMMUNITY
Modern American cities owe much of their defined legislative powers to a single Supreme Court decision that, ironically,
declared them essentially powerless unless a state gives them
plenary legislative abilities. 21 The backlash against this decision
provoked many states to adopt home rule amendments, whereby
cities could pass their own local legislation in certain enumerated areas. This Part discusses the extent to which these amendments also protect a city’s ability to pass legislation that is purely
local. Section A explores the effect of the landmark decision in
Hunter v. Pittsburgh on the modern city-state relationship. Sections B and C discuss Dillon’s Rule and special legislation, respectively, and how these provided legal context for the decision
in Hunter. Section D outlines the home rule movement as a response to these legal concepts, and the extent to which the framers of such provisions intended to protect purely local activities
from state interference.
A. HUNTER V. PITTSBURGH AND THE CITY AS A “CREATURE OF
THE STATE”
Before 1907, the Supreme Court had not established a clear
power structure between cities and states. Since the Revolution,
courts had regarded American cities as quasi-private corpora-

21. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
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tions. While maintaining the democratic characteristics of governments through elected representation, cities still allowed citizens to protect local interests beyond the power of a state or federal government. Still, courts were confused on how to fully
define the rights of cities in relation to other organizations. 22 In
1819, the Supreme Court decided, in Trustees of Dartmouth v.
Woodward, that the distinction between “public” and “private”
corporations rested largely on the scope of property rights. 23 This
holding still left cities in a somewhat undefined constitutional
category, however. 24 The Court held that public corporations
“are such only as are founded by the government for public purposes, where the whole interests belong also to the government,”
thus leaving the private corporation label a possibility for cities
that did not meet this definition. 25 This uncertainty created a
blank slate on which the Supreme Court could imbue cities with
whatever level of independence it saw fit.
The Supreme Court finally crafted a bright line definition
for city-state relations in Hunter v. Pittsburgh.26 In Hunter, the
town of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, challenged a state law that allowed consolidation of two adjoining localities on a majority vote
of the populations of both towns.27 The combined majority of both
localities had voted for the measure to consolidate, even though
the majority of voters in Allegheny had voted against it. 28 Allegheny argued that the state law allowing the vote deprived them
of their property without due process, as their tax burden would
increase after the town was folded into the larger municipality. 29
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to
compel the consolidation. While acknowledging that the publicprivate distinction in defining municipal corporate power was
ambiguous, the Court did not feel it necessary to rehash prior
decisions delineating the full list of the rights of cities and their
22. See GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT
BUILDING WALLS 38–45 (1999).
23. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 668–69
(1819) (“Another division of corporations is into public and private. Public corporations are generally esteemed such as exist for public political purposes only,
such as towns, cities, parishes, and counties; and in many respects they are so,
although they involve some private interests . . . .”).
24. See FRUG, supra note 22 (noting the ambiguity of the holding in Woodward).
25. See id.
26. Hunter, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 176.
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“citizens and creditors.” 30 Instead, the Court found it sufficient
to proclaim that “[m]unicipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising
such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them.” 31 Because of this relationship, the Court reasoned, “[t]he number, nature, and duration” of all of a municipality’s powers “rests in the absolute discretion of the State.” 32
While the precise contours of a municipality’s rights and powers
had not been fully articulated after Hunter, it was at least clear
that cities would henceforth be considered “creatures of the
state” as a matter of federal constitutional law.33
B. DILLON’S RULE AND THE TRADITIONAL CITY-STATE
RELATIONSHIP
The pivotal decision in Hunter was the culmination of a long
battle at the state court level over how to frame the relationship
between municipalities and their parent governments. By the
late nineteenth century, the popular view among state courts
was that cities should at most serve “as a limited coordinating
mechanism through which property owners could secure their
investments from public interference, rather than as a public
agent through which the people could collectively plan a new society.” 34 The rejection of a model that treated cities as public entities capable of broad autonomy necessitated a clear expression
of how states could limit municipal power. 35 First published in
1872, John Dillon’s Municipal Corporations became the most
popular articulation of the traditional, or “state creature,” citystate model. 36 While not every jurisdiction has officially adopted
Dillon’s Rule, its passing approval in the Supreme Court’s decision in Hunter 37 demonstrates its relevance in understanding
the modern city-state relationship.
Dillon’s Rule established two important tenets of local government power. First, a municipality could exercise only those
30. Id. at 178.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978); City
of Herriman v. Bell, 590 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2010).
34. David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2283
(2003).
35. See id.
36. See JOHN DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448 (5th ed. 1911).
37. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907).
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powers that were either: (1) granted in express words; (2) “necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to” those express grants
of power; or (3) “essential” to the goals of the municipal corporation.38 Second, these powers, when granted, were to be narrowly
construed by courts, thus minimizing city power beyond only the
clearest of intent on the part of the state. 39 When read in conjunction with the holding in Hunter, Dillon’s Rule has since provided a legal framework in which a city can only pass certain
ordinances if it has received express authority from its state legislature. State legislatures nationwide capitalized on this fully
articulated framework. The drafting of Dillon’s Rule and its
adoption into many state constitutions led to a wave of special
legislation that targeted the affairs of specific cities. 40 Yet even
as this device promoted a traditional city-state model in a powerful way, it also spawned the movement that pushed back
against it.
C. THE RISE OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION
Dillon’s Rule and Hunter created a prohibitive framework
that allowed state legislatures to pass laws targeting cities individually. 41 As the acceptance of the state creature view of cities
gained hold over American jurisprudence, urban reformers became increasingly concerned with attempts by state legislators
to interfere with local issues.42 The system that was designed to
create defined and separate roles for state and city in fact led to
a power imbalance in favor of the state over city.
The premise that cities were mere creatures of the state legislature
seemed only to encourage state legislators to think of local power as an
extension of their own power. It also encouraged those local factions
seeking a more interventionist local governmental climate to look to
the state legislature for assistance at home. Even if Dillon’s Rule could
check city governments’ independent efforts to grant franchises to certain private interests, for example, it could not stop the state legislature from validating such local actions. . . . Thus, a strong legal presumption of state supremacy could easily be understood to entwine
local matters ever more deeply with state legislative politics and thus

38. DILLON, supra note 36, at 448.
39. See id. at 455.
40. See FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 166 (6th ed. 2015) (“[The
state creature model] encouraged state legislators to intervene in the affairs of
municipalities, not only as a class, but also individually. As urban centers began
to grow in the nineteenth century, legislators increasingly began to enact special laws that targeted particular cities.”).
41. Id.
42. See Barron, supra note 34, at 2286.
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to assist the state legislative grab for political and economic spoils that
urban growth precipitated. 43

This newfound state power over cities resulted in an increase in
state legislatures passing special legislation that, rather than
applying to all municipalities in a jurisdiction, targeted individual cities, effectively displacing municipal decisions to the state
level.44 Urban reformers who saw this new device as a problem
pushed for, and in many cases achieved, state constitutional
bans on such laws.45 Limiting state legislative power by requiring them to pass general legislation was thus seen as an attempt
to “preserve the idealized and limited local sphere that Dillon
hoped to protect.” 46
Even these constitutional limits, however, ultimately
proved insufficient to protect against the state-creature model.
In response to the bans on special legislation, state lawmakers
passed artfully worded laws that had the appearance of a general provision, but in practice still targeted individual localities.47 Meanwhile, state courts were mostly willing to approve of
such legislative ingenuity. 48 By the time the Supreme Court legitimized the state-creature model of American cities in 1907,
there was a growing sense among those who wanted to preserve
a local sphere of governance to cities that new constitutional
schemes would be needed. 49 The ensuing debate would be over
whether these frameworks should preserve a private role for cities, or create a new avenue of local self-governance.

43. Barron, supra note 34, at 2286–87.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 2287–88.
46. Id. at 2288.
47. Some of these laws were less targeted at individual localities than others. See N.Y. GEN MUN. LAW § 101 (McKinney 2008) (requiring construction projects above three million dollars in certain counties in New York to “prepare
separate specifications” for various “subdivisions” involved in the project, but
lowering the dollar amount threshold for such specifications in projects that
take place in other counties). The constitutionality of this law was challenged
and upheld in Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.
v. Smith, 992 N.E.2d 1067 (N.Y. 2013).
48. See Barron, supra note 34, at 2288 (citing Gerald E. Frug, The City as
a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1108–13 (1980)); see also, e.g., Chi. Nat’l
League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (Ill. 1985) (approving a
general law that subjected all stadiums “in a city with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants, in a stadium in which . . . nighttime events were not played prior to
July 1, 1982,” to noise pollution regulations, even though it in effect could only
be applied to one municipality and stadium in the state).
49. See Barron, supra note 34, at 2288.
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D. THE HOME RULE MOVEMENT
At the same time that Hunter and Dillon’s Rule were entrenching the state creature model as the consensus view on city
power, city populations were doubling in size every decade.50
With this new reality came new challenges. Reformers had to
find ways to address issues in taxing, housing, sanitation, and
other administrative concerns, in spite of a model that deprived
them of the flexibility to act without express permission from a
parent political body. 51 Home rule amendments ultimately
emerged as a method for preserving the local sphere of power for
the modern city. 52 This Section explores this movement in municipal government reform in further detail.
1. Theoretical Underpinnings and Defining Local Concern
Missouri became the first state to institute a home rule
amendment to its constitution in 1875.53 The amendment allowed any city with a population of more than 100,000 residents
to “frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and
subject to the Constitution and laws of [the] State.” 54 Thus, the
charter allowed cities for the first time to structure themselves
by a “foundational governing document,” without an express
grant from a state legislature.55 The divergent motivations for
this new grant of municipal authority, however, were not solely
focused on “local power for its own sake.” 56 Rather, the overriding desire to achieve good government meant that the push for
home rule created different theories on what local concern
should look like. 57 This division led to an array of actual home
rule amendments that could allow courts to reach different conclusions about what belonged to municipal governance, and
what belonged to the state.

50. See id. at 2289 (citing ROBERT E. FOGLESONG, PLANNING THE CAPITALIST CITY: THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE 1920S 60 (1986); ARTHUR MEIER SCHLESINGER, THE RISE OF THE CITY, 1878–1898, at 64, 68 (1933)).
51. Id. (citing DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS
IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 112–208 (1998)).

52. See FRUG ET AL., supra note 40, at 175 (noting that Missouri became
the first state to adopt a home rule provision in 1875).
53. MO. CONST. OF 1875, art. IX, § 16.
54. Id.
55. Barron, supra note 34, at 2290.
56. Id. at 2291.
57. Id.
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a. The McBain Nine and the Conservative Approach
Many reformers who supported the home rule movement did
so not because they thought it would usher in a new wave of expansive municipal power. Rather, they saw it as a way of preserving the limited functionality of cities that had been legitimized by Dillon’s Rule, while also curbing expanding state
interference that threatened to undermine this traditional relationship.58 The simultaneous concern that: (1) the great cities
were gaining too much power over taxing and spending, rather
than protecting private property interests as cities had traditionally been responsible for; and (2) state legislative influence
would corrupt the local self-determination that had made such
protection possible in the first place, required a new model to
preserve the status quo. 59 Thus, home rule amendments were to
be limited to charter-making abilities, with states only able to
confer authority over what was considered “of traditionally ‘local’
concern” as prescribed by what Dillon had termed the “usual
range.” 60 The role of state courts would be to “police th[e]
boundar[ies]” between state and local in their interpretations of
constitutional home rule amendments.61 Furthermore, provisions requiring any additional grants of power be general would
limit state legislatures’ abilities to either alter or expand these
powers, in some cases wholly removing local matters from consideration at the state level. 62
There are few indicators of what exactly this usual range
was intended to entail. As some commentators have noted, leaving the power of interpreting what was appropriately local and
what belonged exclusively to state consideration in the hands of
state courts did not prevent “an adventurous city” from “assert[ing] home rule authority in unanticipated ways.” 63 It also
58. Id. at 2294.
59. See id. at 2294–95.
60. JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 91, at 148 (4th ed. 1890) (“ The rule of strict construction of corporate
powers is . . . applicable to grants of powers to municipal and public bodies
which are out of the usual range, or which may result in public burdens, or
which, in their exercise, touch the right to liberty or property or, as it may be
compendiously expressed, any common-law right of the citizen or inhabitant.”).
61. Barron, supra note 34, at 2294–95.
62. Id.
63. Id.; see also JON C. TEAFORD, THE UNHERALDED TRIUMPH: CITY GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA, 1870–1900, at 116–22 (1984) (discussing the difficulties
of home rule cities in nineteenth century Missouri and California in structuring
their own governments, a quintessential homerule function, in light of state supreme court rulings that limited the powers of state legislatures).
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did little to stop a court from rubber-stamping that assertion of
power as sufficiently local if it felt like doing so. 64 However, when
considering the underlying motivations behind these traditional
conceptions of home rule, there are, at minimum, certain areas
that could be considered definitively beyond local government
concern. In his expansive treatise, The Law and the Practice of
Municipal Home Rule, 65 Howard Lee McBain demarcates nine
areas that he considered well outside the scope of a home rule
city’s authority:
The [subject matters] that have given rise to this problem are those
that are commonly dealt with in charters of legislative origin. No city
has ever attempted to draw unto itself the complete powers of the state.
By common understanding such general subjects as . . . domestic relations, wills and administration, mortgages, trusts, contracts, real and
personal property, insurance, banking, corporations, and many others
have never been regarded by any one, least of all by the cities themselves, as appropriate subjects of local control. No city has been so foolhardy as to venture generally into any one of these fields of law. It has
simply been universally accepted that these matters are strictly of
“state concern.” 66

The thrust of McBain’s treatise was to argue for a more logical
and clear understanding of home rule power. 67 Later commentators have referred to this list of areas of law that cities would be
“foolhardy” to explore as the McBain Nine, or the private law
exception. 68 And while McBain himself was not necessarily a
conservative home ruler, his matter-of-fact dismissal of these areas as of “strictly ‘state concern’” speaks to a common belief
among conservative urban reformers: home rule should limit city
power as much as it expanded it. In attempting to articulate why
exceptions like the McBain Nine are “appropriate and even nec-

64. Barron, supra note 34, at 2294–95. The Supreme Court’s struggle, or
even disinterest, in Hunter to clearly define the public versus private nature of
municipal corporations further demonstrates the difficulty of drawing clear
lines between areas of law that belong to one area of government over another.
Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
65. HOWARD LEE MCBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL
HOME RULE (1916).
66. Id. at 673 (emphasis added).
67. See id. at vii (“No constitutional provision granting home rule powers
should be drafted without an accurate and detailed knowledge of the origin and
nature of [home rule’s ambiguities]. It is unjust that the courts should be compelled to give precise definition to terms which have no precision of meaning
and be forced to determine complicated questions of public policy which the
framers of constitutions have either lightly ignored or deliberately dodged.”).
68. Gary T. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20 UCLA L. REV. 671, 690 (1973).
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essary,” scholars have examined areas of law that are “inefficient” in application at the municipal level. 69 Because the success of certain areas of law depend upon uniformity and minimal
burdens upon state schemes of administration, the traditional
view of home rule favored city power that did not interfere, or
have the potential to interfere, with state-level schemes that
could be applied evenly. 70 Local concern, then, was limited to areas that did not depend upon such uniformity. This view informed the construction of home rule charters that focused on
extending city power only to those areas that state legislatures
could not manage at a general level.
b. The Progressive Approach

Unlike the traditional perspective, the progressive reformers comprised a broader spectrum of opinions regarding how cities best fit into a relationship with their parent states. 71 The one
area on which they were unified, however, was their disapproval
of the state creature model. 72 Despite the varying beliefs regarding what a city could or should be in a growing urban America,73
the home rule amendments that came out of these progressive
approaches nevertheless demonstrated the belief in preserving
separate spheres of municipal power in order for local concern to
encompass new challenges.
One such progressive approach to home rule was what David J. Barron has coined the administrative city. 74 Under this
perspective, cities needed to be protected from state interference,
but not because of the fear that such usurpation would divert
cities from their traditional functions. Rather, progressive reformers like Frank J. Goodnow believed that modern cities
69. See id. at 753 (“If the conclusion thus is that undue burden and extreme
inefficiency do function as predicates for home rule exceptions, it is important
to note that the private law component of a city ordinance will often significantly
add to the overall magnitude of its burden or the extent of its inefficiency.”).
70. Id.
71. See Barron, supra note 34, at 2300–20. Barron distinguishes between
those who saw cities as administrative tools through which local technocrats
could implement local policies, and still more progressive reformers, who saw
the city as being truly political bodies and capable of functioning as self-sufficient governmental bodies.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 2323; see also JON C. TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA, 1850–1970, at 8 (1979)
(discussing the correlation between liberalized incorporation laws and the increase in new municipalities).
74. See Barron, supra note 34, at 2300.
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needed to be nimble enough to face challenges that the traditional model of city-state sovereignty was too rigid to regulate. 75
Part of this shifting attitude was a practical understanding that
the “accelerating interdependence of a nationalizing industrial
economy” required cities to embrace new definitions of local concern that the “anachronistic” traditional model did not contemplate. 76 The other motivating factor was the growing belief that
the “larger social realm beyond one’s private life” that existed in
modern cities required them to function as more than “facilitators” of private property interests.77 For Goodnow and other progressives, the solution was to push for a home rule that allowed
cities to function with broad police powers, without having to
juggle the competing interests of state politics.78 Doing so would
allow technical experts, rather than political interests, to operate local governments as quasi-private administrative agencies.79
Other progressive reformers felt that cities should oppose
the traditional “culture of privatism” through “collective action.” 80 This view, which Barron terms the social city approach,
placed value in city power that was “public and political, rather
than quasi-private or administrative.” 81 Much like Goodnow,
these progressives believed that home rule was critical for preserving city power from state interference. Unlike Goodnow,
however, these reformers hoped that home rule could be used not
for “administration all the way down,” 82 but rather to unleash a
political “city sense” that “would attract to its service big, farsighted men no longer willing to leave urban politics to the petty
grafters and bosses.” 83 Thus, the social goals of a city should be
protected under home rule because of the unrealized potential
75. See id. at 2301.
76. Michael H. Frisch, Urban Theorists, Urban Reform, and American Political Culture in the Progressive Period, 97 POL. SCI. Q. 295, 307 (1982).
77. Barron, supra note 34, at 2301.
78. See id. at 2301–02.
79. This view of the city as administrative agency was a popular progressive belief at that time. See FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION
84 (1914) (“[M]unicipal government is very largely a matter of administration
in the narrow sense of the word. This is the truth at the bottom of the claim
which is so often made, that municipal government is a matter of business.”).
80. Barron, supra note 34, at 2309.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 2308.
83. DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 141 (1998).
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cities had to implement useful change, even beyond the administrative managing model that Goodnow had envisioned.
Both of these views were bold departures from the traditional state creature model of cities contemplated by Dillon’s
Rule and Hunter. Regardless of motive, progressive home rulers
hoped to create amendments that would empower cities to play
important roles, wholly separate from the state agenda. To be
sure, there was still a belief that cities should be limited in their
capacities, either because the administrative city was too “scientific” to safely harbor notions of “local autonomy,” 84 or because
such limits were “necessary preconditions for the city’s realization of its full potential as a social institution.” 85 But even without strong convictions for “local autonomy for its own sake,”
these visions of home rule gave states rationales to create provisions that expanded the understanding of local concern beyond
what Dillon had ever contemplated. In the progressive home rule
view, the collective understanding of what constituted local concern needed to be flexible to meet the evolving needs of cities, as
well as protected from state interference in order to ensure that
those needs could be met uninhibited. 86 Ultimately, both the traditional and progressive perspectives inform the reach of home
rule. The motivations that led to the plain language of these
amendments can also provide courts with proper context to either uphold new municipal efforts as necessary expansion, or to
strike them down as beyond the scope of local concern.
2. Home Rule Initiative
The home rule movement was primarily concerned with two
objectives: (1) imbuing local governments with spheres of power
in which they could “operate under a general grant of authority
from the state”; and (2) giving cities “an area of autonomy immune from state control, even by general legislation.” 87 The second aspect of this concern is often referred to as home rule immunity, 88 and is the primary concern of this Note. It is
nevertheless important to understand the mechanics of the other
half, or home rule initiative, first.
84. See Frisch, supra note 76 (describing the danger proponents of the administrative city saw in “[d]elusions of autonomy” that “could only produce a
net loss in civic capacity, putting effective power into the hands of a local business elite or the state legislature, and most likely both in corrupt tandem”).
85. Barron, supra note 34, at 2311.
86. See id. at 2310–21.
87. FRUG ET AL., supra note 40, at 174.
88. See, e.g., id. at 174–75.
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a. Defining the Scope of Home Rule Initiative
Home rule initiative became the chosen solution to the constraints placed on cities after Hunter. Constitutional amendments providing for the formation of city governments allowed
localities to pass their own laws without seeking express permission from their parent states every time a new ordinance needed
to be passed. For example, the Arizona Constitution allows
“[a]ny city containing, now or hereafter, a population of more
than three thousand five hundred” to “frame a charter for its own
government consistent with, and subject to, the Constitution and
the laws of the state.” 89 Courts in Arizona have even interpreted
the ability of a city to “frame a charter for its own government”
as conferring positive powers of local authority that “render the
cities adopting such charter provisions as nearly independent of
state legislation as . . . possible.” 90 Even without grants of authority as broad as Arizona, home rule states that allowed cities
of a certain size to pass charters created at least a limited level
of local autonomy. 91 Typically, the only outer limit of such grants
is that they be of local or municipal concern, the “source of city
power . . . depend[ing] in many cases on the particular terms of
the home rule grant or on judicial determinations concerning the
kinds of actions that are properly understood to concern ‘local’ or
‘municipal’ affairs.” 92 Once this initiative power has been imbued into a state’s constitution, state courts become important
tools in defining not only its limits, but the existence of other
implied negative powers often not fully articulated in the constitutional text.
b. The Role of the Courts in Shaping Home Rule
As discussed further in Parts II and III, courts also play an
important role in defining the boundary between local authority
89. ARIZ. CONST. art. 13, § 2.
90. City of Tucson v. Walker, 135 P.2d 223, 226 (Ariz. 1943) (quoting Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 2 N.W.2d 613, 614 (Neb. 1942)).
91. But see Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (“[A state] at
its pleasure may modify or withdraw all [of a city’s] powers, may take without
compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand
or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done,
conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or
even against their protest.”). The significance of this language, and whether it
may simply obfuscate any hope for home rule immunity, is discussed in Part
III.D, infra.
92. FRUG ET AL., supra note 40, at 176.
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and state policy. 93 In ruling on cases involving home rule initiatives, a court’s holding on the constitutionality of a particular
ordinance will often boil down to whether that local law has exceeded the scope of a local concern or otherwise interferes with a
state-created legal scheme. 94 Many commentators argue that
this archetypal framework can lead to broader home rule provisions that eschew the state versus local distinction, which can
ironically hamper a city’s ability to pass its own legislation.95 If
a city has a grant to “exercise any legislative power or perform
any function” of a state legislature, for example, the capacity of
a court to intervene and interpret what powers constitute local
or municipal concern may be severely limited, leaving the scope
of local power to be fully defined through state legislative action
(or lack thereof). 96
The tension courts often face in defining the boundary between state and local power was on full display in McCrory Corp.
v. Fowler. 97 In that case, a Maryland county ordinance creating
a private cause of action for employment discrimination was
found to exceed the county’s home rule authority. 98 Maryland’s
constitution, which grants to all of its counties “full power to enact local laws . . . upon all matters covered by the express powers
granted as above provided,” effectively barred the creation of a
new private cause of action at the county level in the area of employment discrimination. 99 The McCrory court reasoned that
this area of law, “which heretofore had been the province of state
agencies,” was too far beyond the scope of the county’s home rule
93. See infra Part II.B.2., Part III.
94. See, e.g., Order Dismissing Petition at 5–10, Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, No. 27-CV-16-11839 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016).
95. FRUG ET AL., supra note 40, at 176.
96. There is a considerable amount of disagreement on the extent to which
a broad or narrow conception of home rule matters more for local government
power. Some proponents of narrow home rule provisions argue that well-defined
categories of local authority give courts the freedom to permit important powers
at a local level, while holding in check municipal legislative actions that
threaten statewide policies. See Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal
Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964).
Meanwhile, other commentators point out that express limitations on local issues can just as easily allow courts to deem issues of pressing societal need outside the scope of local concern, creating an easy out from further consideration
of whether certain areas of law are, or need to be, legislated at a state level. See
Barron, supra note 34, at 2349–50.
97. McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 570 A.2d 834 (Md. 1990).
98. Id. at 834–35.
99. Id. at 836.
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initiative to be deemed constitutional.100 The next question is
then whether, just as the municipality interfered with protected
state powers in McCrory, states can be deemed to have gone too
far in their intrusion on protected municipal matters.
3. Home Rule Immunity

Embedded within the limiting of city power to local issues is
the possibility that, while cities cannot exceed the outer limits of
such authority, states similarly cannot impinge on a city’s ability
to remain autonomous in areas that are truly local in nature.
The implied negative power of home rule amendments is a limit
on state control over local affairs that many have identified as
home rule immunity.101 Frug et al. describe a basic dichotomy in
understanding home rule immunity: (1) immunity in the face of
interference in areas where cities more likely do not have plenary initiative power from a state government; and (2) immunity
in the face of interference in areas where they do have authority
from state governments to enact such provisions. 102 The authors
use this basic categorization in order to demonstrate that home
rule immunity, “to the extent it exists at all, depends on state
law.” 103 Pushing the boundaries of home rule immunity, then,
depends on how judicial interpretations of it vary across different categories of local concern, whether a court’s conception of
local is flexible, and the extent to which state law has previously
attempted to regulate those areas.
Some judicial interpretations of home rule immunity are
made in a context under which a city may not have had plenary
authority to enact legislation in the first place. In New Orleans
Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, the New
Orleans city council placed a provision to establish a minimum
wage by amending the city charter on the ballot. 104 The charter
amendment was adopted, then was swiftly followed by a declaratory judgment proceeding on (1) the validity of the amendment;
100. Id. at 838.
101. See, e.g., William R. Andersen, Resolving State/Local Governmental
Conflict—A Tale of Three Cities, 18 URB. L. ANN. 129, 131 (1980).
102. FRUG ET AL., supra note 40, at 198.
103. Id.
104. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825
So. 2d 1098, 1101–03 (La. 2002) (quoting Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785
So. 2d 1, 14 (La. 2001)) (“[I]n affairs of local concern, a home rule charter government possesses ‘powers which within its jurisdiction are as broad as that of
the state, except when limited by the constitution, laws permitted by the constitution, or its own home rule charter.’”).
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and (2) the unconstitutionality of a prior Louisiana state law
that “prohibit[ed] local governmental subdivisions from establishing a minimum wage.” 105 The Supreme Court of Louisiana
ruled that the charter amendment violated state law. 106 While
recognizing that “Article VI [of the Louisiana Constitution] protects home rule governments from unwarranted interference by
the state in their internal affairs” through the requirement that
local control only be revoked or changed by a “reasonable exercise of the state’s police power,” the state law at issue here was
clearly intended to do just that.107 The state law, the Living
Wage court held, had been passed based on reasonable policy
findings that issues of wages were a statewide issue, and thus
the prohibition against passing parallel ordinances at the local
level did not infringe on the power of immunity granted to Louisiana municipalities. 108 While acknowledging the existence of
home rule immunity, the court seemed to place an emphasis on
whether an arguably local issue overlapped with a previously established statewide concern, even in attempting to regulate that
concern on a small scale. 109
Juxtaposed against these cases are instances where a state
legislature attempts to revoke or alter a municipality’s power
where it may already have been granted. In City of Tucson v.
State, the Arizona legislature amended state law to alter the process by which city council members in cities could be elected. 110
The city brought suit, citing the home rule provision of the Arizona Constitution. That amendment gave eligible cities the ability to adopt charters, and the power to “frame its own organic
law, including the power to determine ‘who shall be its governing
officers and how they shall be selected.’” 111 The Supreme Court
of Arizona ruled in the city’s favor. Despite a state legislative
finding that “the conduct of elections . . . is a matter of statewide
concern,” the City of Tucson court reasoned that Arizona’s home

105. Id. at 1101.
106. Id. at 1108.
107. Id. at 1103–07.
108. See id. at 1108.
109. See id.; see also Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d
30, 39 (Colo. 2000) (finding that the issue of local rent control “[is] not so discretely local that all state interests are superseded,” thus invalidating the local
ordinance where it conflicted with broader state policy).
110. City of Tucson v. State, 273 P.3d 624 (Ariz. 2012).
111. Id. at 625 (quoting Strode v. Sullivan, 236 P.2d 48, 54 (Ariz. 1951)).
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rule provisions were clearly intended, at least in the area of local
elections, to insulate home rule cities from state interference. 112
These cases paint a picture of home rule immunity that is
dependent on: (1) the permissiveness of the home rule language;
and (2) the extent to which the state has staked out a legitimate
interest in the area of law. Some home rule amendments allow
cities to perform the same functions of a state “unless [striking
down the ordinance] is necessary to prevent an abridgement of
the reasonable exercise of the state’s police power,” 113 while others leave the determination as to what activity is state or local
in nature open to court interpretation.114 But even in states
where cities do not have the power to enact laws with the same
functional power as the state, the factors mentioned above allow
courts to carve out some exceptions whereby municipal governments are protected from state interference. The decision in Living Wage is a prime example of this power. The court’s determination turned, at least in part, on the reasonableness of the
state’s prohibitive measure;115 without a well-grounded rationale on which to deem the minimum wage law a matter of
statewide concern, it is unlikely that the measure would have
been able to penetrate the otherwise broad leeway that court
gave to its home rule amendment. In the current climate of citystate relations, then, a showing of a lack of an actual state interest in the face of a preemptive law may well be the line past
which a state may not intrude on local governance, provided
home rule exists to validate a recognition of local power.
II. THE NEED FOR HOME RULE IMMUNITY WHEN
STATE GOVERNMENTS ABANDON THE FIELD
As discussed in Part I, home rule may only be a practical
tool to the extent it: (1) is sufficient in scope to allow cities to act
upon granted powers; and (2) protects cities from state interference, depending on courts’ interpretations of issues that are sufficiently local.116
112. See id. at 630–32.
113. Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1103 (quoting Morial v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 14 (La. 2001)).
114. See COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6; Town of Telluride 3 P.3d at 37.
115. See Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1103 (quoting Smith & Wesson Corp.,
785 So. 2d at 14) (“Article VI also serves to foster local self-government by allowing home rule entities to utilize their powers and functions on the local level
without revocation, change, or affect by law unless it is necessary to prevent an
abridgement of the reasonable exercise of the state’s police power.”).
116. See supra Part I.
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Traditionally, states can challenge these powers when legislating programs that have a statewide impact, or when a city
ordinance is otherwise in direct conflict with state law. 117 This
Part explores the impact of home rule immunity on situations
where state legislatures have either neglected or chosen not to
address a particular area that localities deem worthy of new legislation. Section A defines this situation as abandoning the field,
and discusses the difference between active and passive abandonment. Part B looks at three examples of home rule amendments (or their equivalents) to see how courts can reframe the
reach of local power in the face of this abandonment. Ultimately,
this Part proposes that when states abandon a particular area of
law, courts are more likely to look at a variety of factors to find
justification for ruling in favor of a city’s attempt to fill a legislative void.
A. DEFINING ABANDONING THE FIELD
The energy benchmarking legislation in Arizona discussed
above fashions a unique brand of preemption. 118 First, it explicitly prohibits any city or town from “requir[ing] an owner, operator or tenant of a business, commercial building or multifamily
housing property to measure and report energy usage and consumption, including energy consumption benchmarking and
building facility energy efficiency audits.” 119 Second, and more
notably, it does not purport to actively preempt any of these
banned practices with any legislation of its own; while it technically preempts local ordinances in a literal sense, it does not replace local ordinances with any functional policy in that field of
law. 120 The legislation essentially tells cities and counties that
they are forbidden from acting in an area that the state considers

117. See FRUG ET AL., supra note 40, at 218.
118. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
119. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.36 (2016).
120. See id. (prohibiting cities from passing energy benchmarking bills at
the municipal level without proposing any additional legislative measures that
actually “preempt” such ordinances). The same bill also was meant to block cities from passing ordinances that would impose taxes, fees, or deposits on local
businesses that use disposable bags. This was similarly passed in response to
cities like Tucson, Flagstaff, and Tempe that were considering such measures.
See Howard Fischer, PLASTIC BAGS: Plastic Bag Preemption Enacted, ARIZ.
DAILY SUN (MAR. 15, 2016), http://azdailysun.com/news/local/plastic-bagpreemption-enacted/article_e2146ff3-c4cf-5f79-8fc6-9c5b2a67949a.html.
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“particularly sensitive,” 121 without proposing any alternative
scheme to regulate that area.
Legislation like the energy benchmarking bill that forbids
cities from passing certain ordinances without actively preempting them with any replacement legislation is one way a state can
actively abandon a field of law. Unlike examples of state preemption where courts determine that a state legislature has occupied
the field by passing their own general laws that impact all of its
political subdivisions, 122 this unique brand of preemption simply
prohibits a city from acting without actually addressing the extent to which it is a statewide concern. In states like Arizona,
this active abandonment of a field may occur after and even in
reaction to a city ordinance, thus attempting to unwind local legislation in a targeted fashion not unlike the special legislation of
the pre-home rule movement. 123
Other, less overt examples of state inaction still raise similar questions regarding the limits of city-state preemption. It
may be the case that a city is simply acting ahead of a state on a
certain issue, and legal challenges arise as to whether such action exceeds the scope of a home rule amendment. In Minnesota,
for example, a recent suit challenging a referendum to amend
the Minneapolis charter and raise the local minimum wage centered on whether the issue was simply permissible as a home
rule charter amendment, not whether it conflicted with state
minimum wage laws.124 While the issues in Minnesota do not
involve outright prohibitions of local legislation, cities (or, in this
case, citizens of cities) may nevertheless become unsure of how
to bridge a legislative void on issues that can have a significant
impact at the local level.

121. H.B. 2130, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2016). The bill’s session law explains that the decision to prohibit municipal ordinances regarding energy
benchmarking is based on the conclusion “that small businesses are particularly
sensitive to costs and expenses incurred in complying with regulatory actions of
a city [or] town.”
122. See, e.g., Am. Fin. Servs. v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 820 (Cal.
2005) (finding that an ordinance regulating predatory lending practices was
preempted because a prior state law “impliedly fully occupied the field of regulation . . . and hence the Ordinance is preempted on this ground”).
123. See supra Part I.C.
124. See Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, 887 N.W.2d 467, 469 (Minn. 2016)
(per curiam) (framing the city’s argument against the minimum wage referendum as an issue of the permissive language of the state’s home rule amendment,
not as whether the state had passed a statute directly in conflict with the measure).
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Both of these contexts are quite different from cases like Living Wage. 125 While the exercise of home rule power in that case
was struck down because the state legislature had made determinations that employment issues should be governed at the
state level,126 here, cities are attempting to pass ordinances in a
legislative vacuum and being challenged on similar grounds.
Such challenges are flawed assertions of preemption, however,
because they ignore previously recognized spheres of power that
should be allowed to adapt to an evolving city-state relationship.
As argued in Part III, this type of preemption should be reconsidered, because it restricts local power based on technical statutory construction rather than a practical understanding of
where home rule should start and end. 127 When attempts to pass
new local legislation demonstrate that potential conflicts at the
state level do not serve a legitimate state purpose, courts should
be more willing to recognize that a city’s home rule immunity
powers should outweigh considerations of the state creature
model. 128
B. CASE STUDIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LEGISLATING IN
ABANDONED FIELDS
Cities in states with varying degrees of home rule protections have recently faced challenges to their abilities to legislate
on local issues. This Section examines these situations in turn,
and evaluates the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of
these cities’ delegated powers. In so doing, it frames the difficulties each locality faces in passing laws on issues that their respective states will not act on, in order to provide context to the
possible solutions outlined in Part III. 129

125. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825
So. 2d 1098 (La. 2002).
126. Id. at 1106 (concluding that “[i]n enacting La. R.S. 23:642, the [state]
legislature determined the policy of the State of Louisiana with respect to minimum wage requirements”).
127. See infra Part III.D.
128. But cf. Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization,
2016 BYU L. REV. 177, 253–60 (2016). Stahl argues that current conceptions of
home rule are outdated and that new models that reject the traditional notions
of liberalism are needed to make meaningful change in a globalizing economy.
This Note argues within the framework of traditional conceptions of home rule,
and argues that these models are flexible enough to allow courts to make meaningful determinations over whether a local government should be granted power
to act legislatively.
129. Infra Part III.
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1. North Carolina
On February 22, 2016, the Charlotte City Council passed
Ordinance No. 7056 in a seven to four vote. 130 The legislation
was designed as a broad prohibition against discrimination
based on, among other immutable characteristics, sexual orientation and gender identity. 131 The ordinance specifically targeted discrimination in the use of public accommodations, as
well as in city contracting and the use of for-hire vehicles. 132
Just one month later, the North Carolina General Assembly
convened a special legislative session specifically to pass the
Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, known more colloquially as HB2 or the bathroom bill (hereinafter HB2). 133 The legislation specifically targeted Ordinance No. 7056’s anti-discriminatory measures relating to public accommodations by
specifically requiring any “multiple occupancy bathroom or
changing facility [to] be designated for and only used by persons
based on their biological sex.” 134 The bill also included preemptive language, declaring that the provision “supersede[s] and
preempt[s] any ordinance, regulation, resolution, or policy
adopted or imposed by a unit of local government or other political subdivision of the State that regulates or imposes any requirement pertaining to the regulation of discriminatory practices in places of public accommodation.” 135
The reaction to HB2 was largely negative, both commercially 136 and politically.137 The mounting criticism that the law
130. See Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 (Feb. 22, 2016); Harrison, supra
note 9.
131. See Harrison, supra note 9.
132. See id.
133. 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 2016-3.
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-521.2 (West 2016).
135. Id. § 143-422.11.
136. See, e.g., Alex Kotch, North Carolina’s Anti-LGBT Law Has Cost the
State More Than $560 Million So Far, INST. FOR SOUTHERN STUD.: FACING
SOUTH (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.facingsouth.org/2017/01/north-carolinas
-anti-lgbt-law-has-cost-state-more-560-million-so-far (detailing the companies
that refused to do business in the state as a result of the law’s social policies).
Some researchers estimated that the consequences could have been even more
dire when the bill was first passed. See Katherine Peralta, House Bill 2 Could
Cost N.C. $5 Billion a Year, Report Says, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (May 11, 2016),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/business/article76997927.html.
137. See, e.g., Hundreds Protest HB2 in Downtown Raleigh, ABC 11 EYEWITNESS NEWS (Apr. 8, 2016), http://abc11.com/politics/hundreds-protest-hb2-in
-downtown-raleigh/1273762; Sarah Krueger, More Than 700 People Attend
Anti-House Bill 2 Rally in Greensboro, FOX 8 (Apr. 3, 2016), http://myfox8.com/
2016/04/03/more-than-700-people-attend-anti-house-bill-2-rally-in-greensboro;
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constituted “blatant discrimination” that “ma[de] it public policy
to harass, bully, humiliate, target, and punish LGBT people,” 138
and the resulting commercial consequences of that criticism,
eventually led to a repeal of HB2.139 On March 30, 2017, the
North Carolina legislature passed a revised public accommodation bill, House Bill 142 (hereinafter HB142). 140 HB142 repealed
HB2 in its entirety, but, in a compromise with advocates of the
2016 bill, enacted two significant preemptive measures. First,
HB142 explicitly prohibits “[s]tate agencies, boards, offices, departments, institutions, branches of government, . . . and political subdivisions of the State” from regulating access to public facilities, including restrooms. 141 Second, it prohibits all local
governments from enacting or amending any ordinances “regulating private employment practices or regulating public accommodations.” 142
Ultimately, while the state has rolled back the explicit targeting of HB2 toward LGBT citizens, the preemptive spirit of
that law has been maintained in HB142. Meanwhile, the legal
challenges to HB2 when it was enacted focused mostly on allegations that the restrictions on public accommodations based on
gender identity violated the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the United States Constitution. 143 There was never
pushback from the local level as to whether HB2 impermissibly
violated state law governing the city-state relationship. 144

Bill O’Neil, Petitions Filed to Repeal HB2, WXII NEWS (Apr. 25, 2016), http://
www.wxii12.com/article/petitions-filed-to-repeal-hb2/1932259.
138. Repeal North Carolina’s Anti-LGBT Law, ACLU ACTION (Apr. 24,
2016), https://action.aclu.org/secure/NC-repeal-HB2.
139. See Richard Fausset, North Carolina Strikes a Deal to Repeal Restrictive Bathroom Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
03/29/us/north-carolina-lawmakers-reach-deal-to-repeal-so-called
-bathroom-bill.html.
140. 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 2017-4.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Carcaño v.
McCrory, No. 1:16-cv-236, 2016 WL 1213004, at *33–38 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 28,
2016).
144. HB142 was passed just prior to the completion of this Note. Legal challenges to the new bill, which have already been intimated in correspondence
from opponents of the statute, may invoke interference with local initiative
power, in addition to the equal protection arguments raised against HB2. See
Letter from Sarah M. Gillooly, Policy Dir., ACLU, to Roy Cooper, Governor of
N.C. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/letter/letter-governor-cooper
-requesting-veto-hb-142.

2017]

CITY–STATE PREEMPTION

451

North Carolina is not a home rule state per se. 145 It has,
however, passed broad statutory grants of initiative authority
that contain three important characteristics. First, section 160A-4 of the state code provides that “cities of this State
should have adequate authority to execute the powers, duties,
privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law.” 146 The
statute concludes that the provisions of this power-granting statute and that of city charters “shall be broadly construed . . . to
include any additional and supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and
effect,” so long as they are “not . . . contrary to State or federal
law or to the public policy of this State.” 147 Second, another provision of the same section of the state code grants broad and general regulatory authority: “[a] city may by ordinance define, prohibit, regulate, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions,
detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens and
the peace and dignity of the city, and may define and abate nuisances.” 148 It further requires that such ordinances “be consistent with the Constitution and laws of North Carolina and of
the United States,” but otherwise does not contain any particular limitations.149 However, other more specific state statutes
outline various areas where cities and counties may or may not
pass local legislation. While some laws grant the regulation of
firearm use 150 and “sexually oriented businesses,” within city
limits, 151 others place limits on certain administrative functions,
including property disposal 152 and voting procedures of local governing bodies.153 Finally, the North Carolina Constitution contains no prohibition against special legislation.154 Without this
restriction, a local government may request a special local law
from the state legislature to extend powers not yet conferred to
new areas, so long as such ordinances do not otherwise violate
state law.155
145. Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina Local Governments Need Home
Rule?, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1983, 1985 (2006).
146. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-4 (West 2016).
147. Id.
148. Id. § 160A-174.
149. Id.
150. Id. § 160A-189.
151. Id. § 160A-181.1.
152. See Id. § 160A, art. 12.
153. Id. § 160A-75.
154. See generally N.C. CONST. (failing to prohibit special legislation).
155. See Bluestein, supra note 145, at 2006.
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North Carolina’s statutory structure establishes a complicated delegation of local authority between cities and states
based on a laundry list of specific grants and prohibitions of initiative power. 156 Because the state constitution does not contain
a home rule amendment, courts have instead focused their analysis of this relationship on the extent to which the principles of
Dillon’s Rule apply in the state. While courts have intermittently
applied Dillon’s Rule to cases where local ordinances have been
challenged, the landmark decision of Homebuilder’s Ass’n of
Charlotte v. City of Charlotte pushed back on the prevalence of
Dillon’s Rule.157 That case, which centered on whether Charlotte
could impose fees in connection with regulatory services and use
of public facilities, held that a statutory regime allowing for city
powers to be “broadly construed” should usurp narrower delegations of authority based on Dillon’s Rule and Hunter. 158
Since the decision in Homebuilder’s Ass’n, Dillon’s Rule continues to be invoked in North Carolina, but typically only in situations “where the plain meaning of the statute is without ambiguity.” 159 In BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of
Laurinburg, the state appellate court applied the rationale of
Homebuilder’s Ass’n to conclude that the statutory grant of authority applied in situations of “extending powers to a municipality where there is an ambiguity in the authorizing language,
or the powers clearly authorized reasonably necessitate ‘additional and supplementary powers’ ‘to carry them into execution
and effect.’” 160 If the statute and its grant of authority were not
ambiguous, the BellSouth court concluded, application of the
narrow grants under Dillon’s Rule was more appropriate.161
North Carolina, therefore, seems to sit somewhere between
a home rule state and one that is purely beholden to the state
creature model, at least when it is unclear whether the state has
clearly limited its authority. In situations where cities wish to
pass new legislation for issues that may have a local impact,

156. See id. at 2000–12.
157. Homebuilder ’s Ass’n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45
(N.C. 1994).
158. See id. at 50 (finding it “unnecessary to decide” the question of whether
application of Dillon’s Rule was necessary to decide the “proper rule of construction” because section 160A-4 was more relevant).
159. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Laurinburg, 606 S.E.2d 721, 726
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
160. Id. (quoting Homebuilders Ass’n, 442 S.E.2d at 50).
161. See id.
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such as Ordinance No. 7056, courts are likely to focus on the existence of limiting language in state law. Without a home rule
amendment to provide immunity from interference from the
state level, however, even broad statutory grants of authority
may not provide sufficient space in which cities can operate, despite retaliatory preemption at the state level.
2. Minnesota

Unlike North Carolina, Minnesota is a home rule state; the
Minnesota Constitution provides that “[a]ny local government
unit when authorized by law may adopt a home rule charter for
its government.” 162 Nevertheless, the ability to locally legislate
in an abandoned field has faced recent challenges. In 2016, two
advocacy groups obtained enough signatures to place two proposed amendments to the Minneapolis City Charter on an upcoming ballot: one that would have, over a course of years, increased the minimum wage to fifteen dollars an hour; 163 and one
that would have required all police officers in the city to carry
their own personal liability insurance. 164 When the Minneapolis
City Council voted against including the provisions on the ballot,
the advocacy groups sued in state court, arguing that blocking
the measures from reaching a vote constituted “error[s] with regard to the preparation of a ballot.” 165 Ultimately, both of these
challenges failed. 166 Ignoring the plaintiff’s challenge to the vote
itself, the state district court ruled in Bicking v. City of Minneapolis that state law preempted the proposed ballot measure regarding police liability insurance, because the state had already
passed “extensive regulation” regarding “the city’s obligation to
completely indemnify” its police officers, thus prohibiting a conflicting requirement that officers also carry their own insurance.167

162. MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 4.
163. See Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, 887 N.W.2d 467, 468 (Minn. 2016)
(per curiam).
164. Order Dismissing Petition at 3, Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, No. 27CV-16-11839 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016).
165. Id.
166. See id. at 2; Vasseur, 887 N.W.2d at 474. Ironically, the city of Minneapolis was the challenging party in both cases. But, as discussed infra, these
decisions ultimately did not curb the city’s ability to pass their own ordinances
on these issues because of Minnesota’s strong home rule protections.
167. Order Dismissing Petition at 5–10, Bicking, No. 27-CV-16-11839 (Dist.
Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016).

454

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:427

The minimum wage proposal was also defeated, in the case
Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis. The Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the language of the Minneapolis Charter placed “general legislative authority” squarely within the province of the
City Council, and prohibited passing of legislative acts through
referenda. 168 Eschewing a discussion of whether the proposed
referendum fell within the permissible range of subject matters
that could be incorporated into local legislation, 169 the court held
that the wage amendment, by effectively allowing normal citizens to pass legislative acts rather than the City Council, would
“conflict[] with the permissible form of government adopted in
the Minneapolis City Charter.” 170 This conclusion was based on
section 1.4(a) of the Minneapolis charter, which allows the city
“through the boards, commissions, committees, departments,
and officers” to “exercise any power that a municipal corporation
can lawfully exercise at common law.” 171
While neither of the attempts at grassroots local legislation
in Bicking and Vasseur were successful,172 the decisions both explore the limits of home rule in Minnesota. First, the district
court ruling in Bicking demonstrates the extent to which a
state’s intent to preempt city ordinances in a particular area of
law overrides concerns of whether a particular issue is sufficiently local. Indeed, the district court found that: (1) state law
was intended to occupy the field of tort liability at the municipal
level through language that claimed that the relevant statutes
were “exclusive of and supersede[d] all home rule charter provisions . . . on the same subject heretofore and hereafter adopted”;
and (2) the proposed charter amendment directly conflicted with
168. Vasseur, 887 N.W.2d at 471.
169. See id. at 473 (concluding that the court “d[id] not need to define the
precise meaning of the phrase ‘local municipal functions’” within the meaning
of the state’s statute regarding acceptable subject matter for home rule charters).
170. Id. at 471.
171. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CITY CHARTER § 1.4(a) (2017). The court also
noted in its decision that section 4.1(a) of the charter grants the City Council
the “City’s general legislative and policymaking authority.” See Vasseur, 887
N.W.2d at 470–71 (citing MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CITY CHARTER § 4.1(a) (2017)).
172. In 2017, the Minneapolis City Council passed a minimum wage ordinance that largely aligned with the original proposal at issue in Vasseur. See
City Council Passes Municipal Minimum Wage Ordinance, MINNEAPOLISMN.GOV (June 30, 2017), http://news.minneapolismn.gov/2017/06/30/city
-council-passes-municipal-minimum-wage-ordinance/. Vasseur may therefore
best be understood as a debate on division between city and citizen implementation of home rule power, rather than whether that area of law properly fell
within home responsibilities in general.
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state law, including provisions that regulated the responsibility
of municipalities to purchase insurance and represent police officers in all tort cases. 173 Thus, the pervasiveness of existing regulation at the state level was sufficient to obviate any discussion
of whether, in general, the area of municipal liability fell within
the substantive scope of Minnesota’s home rule.
Second, and more significantly, the district court decision in
Vasseur discussed at length the limits of acceptable subject matters that might appear in a Minnesota home rule charter.174 The
decision highlighted section 410.07 of the Minnesota Statutes,
which allows cities to go beyond simply establishing the structure of local government.
Subject to the limitations in this chapter provided, [a home rule charter] may provide for any scheme of municipal government not inconsistent with the constitution, and may provide for the establishment
and administration of all departments of a city government, and for the
regulation of all local municipal functions, as fully as the legislature
might have done before home rule charters for cities were authorized
by constitutional amendment in 1896. 175

As the district court discussed, city power is encapsulated in the
phrase “may provide for the establishment and administration
of all departments of a city government.” 176 The court held that
the second clause of that sentence, “may provide for . . . the regulation of all local municipal functions,” demonstrates a broad
delegation of legislative home rule power. 177 A state’s delegation
of the ability to craft a charter to a home rule city in turn gives
that city the power to confer legislative power to either a city
council (in the form of an ordinance) or its citizens (in the form
of a referendum to amend the charter, if the city chooses to include that power in the charter). 178 In other words, the only limiting factors on what can be included in a city ordinance under
Minnesota law is: (1) the extent to which it conflicts with state
law; 179 and (2) the legislative procedures a city elects to confer
173. Order Dismissing Petition at 5–10, Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, No.
27-CV-16-11839 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016).
174. Order Granting Petition at 9–10, Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, No.
27-CV-16-11794 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 22, 2016).
175. MINN. STAT. § 410.07 (2017).
176. See Order Granting Petition at 10, Vasseur, No. 27-CV-16-11794 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 22, 2016).
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See MINN. STAT. § 410.07 (allowing for legislative acts in charters so
long as they are “not inconsistent with the constitution”); see also Order Dismissing Petition at 4, Bicking v. City of Minneapolis, No. 27-CV-16-11839 (Dist.
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upon its citizens.180 As discussed in Part III, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision overturning the district court may have
only further highlighted the changing expectation of the areas of
law that can constitute a local concern. 181
These two cases demonstrate both the relative strength of
home rule in Minnesota, and the extent to which judicial interpretation can have a profound impact on defining the malleable
boundaries of home rule authority. By recognizing that the relevant statutes governing home rule are permissive in a given
state, courts are more inclined to in turn set broad standards for
what can constitute a local concern. The failure to amend the
Minneapolis Charter in no way diminished, and actually brought
to light, the understanding that Minnesota home rule cities may
legislate on “any subject appropriate to the orderly conduct of
municipal affairs.” 182 As discussed in Part III, such broad statutory language can create revised expectations of the areas of law
that are suitable for legislation at the local level. 183 When coupled with a lack of affirmative policies in that area at the state
level, courts should also embrace a new default presumption that
allows cities to step up and fill these legislative voids, even in
the face of retaliatory preemption.
3. Arizona
Arizona’s recent difficulties, as outlined above, 184 are arguably more extreme than the challenges unfolding in North Carolina and Minnesota.185 In those states, cities have been trying
to carve out more power based on legislative silence at the state
level in certain areas of law. 186 In Arizona, attempts to interfere
with local legislation bear more of a resemblance to the aggressive overextension of the state creature model that originally led
Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016). As the district court explained in that decision, the
clear pervasiveness of state preemption was dispositive for striking down the
charter amendment; the court did not see it necessary to discuss the same issues
raised in Vasseur because the preemption was a threshold issue. Id. at 7–8.
180. See Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, 887 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Minn. 2016)
(per curiam).
181. See infra Part III.B.
182. Vasseur, 887 N.W.2d at 473 (quoting Markley v. City of St. Paul, 172
N.W. 215, 216 (Minn. 1919)).
183. See infra Part III.B.
184. See supra notes 1–6, 15–16, and accompanying text.
185. Supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2.
186. In North Carolina, although the state legislature eventually implemented explicitly preemptive statutory language, it had been silent on the issue
before the passing of HB2.
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to the pushback from home rule reformers.187 In addition to the
energy benchmarking bill that strictly prohibits local governments from passing new legislation on related issues, 188 the recent bill that gives any state lawmaker the power to recommend
to the State Attorney General that an ordinance violates state
law, SB1487, goes a step further: it not only preempts particular
local concerns, but potentially all future local concerns, in a way
that circumvents judicial review entirely.189
Home rule cities in Arizona are in the early stages of responding to these preemptive laws. In Tucson, a state legislator
reported to the Attorney General that a local ordinance providing for the destruction of confiscated firearms, codified as section
2-142 of the Tucson Code in 2005,190 violated a 2013 state law
that explicitly prohibited and preempted such practices. 191 The
Attorney General filed a report, in compliance with SB1487, that
(1) the ordinance “may violate” state law; and (2) that SB1487’s
preemptive proscriptions could be retroactively applied, thus
triggering SB1487’s procedures regarding potential withholding
of state funding. 192 In response, the city filed a lawsuit in state
district court, challenging the constitutionality of SB1487, which
was then removed to a special hearing in front of the Arizona
Supreme Court.193 At oral argument, the discussion of SB1487
focused on whether the power to occupy any field being regulated
at the local level through this new preemption law effectively
“nullif[ies] the charter authority” set forth in the state constitution.194 Especially because the city ordinance had predated both
the state’s 2013 law and SB1487, the parties and the court appeared to struggle with when to preserve local power in the face
of reactive preemption. 195
The more deliberate nature of Arizona’s recent preemptive
legislation, therefore, presents a unique challenge for cities:
187. See supra Part I.C.
188. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.36 (2016).
189. Id. § 41-194.01.
190. TUCSON, ARIZ., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 2-142 (2005).
191. See Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Special Relief ¶ 56, City
of Tucson v. State, No. C20165733 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2016).
192. See OFFICE OF ARIZ. ATT’Y GEN., INVESTIGATIVE REP. NO. 16-002 (2016).
193. See Order, State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, No. CV-16-0301-SA
(Ariz. Aug. 17, 2017).
194. Oral Argument at 25:28, State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson, No.
CV-16-0301-SA, (Ariz. Jan. 18, 2017) http://supremestateaz.granicus.com/
MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=2109#.
195. See id. at 13:02–15:04, 18:13–29:20, 41:23–42:15, 45:07–45:40.
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where the intent of the state legislature is clearly geared toward
active preemption, there is a temptation to fall back on the state
creature framework and declare that any occupied field belongs
to state law. But Arizona cities are afforded unusually strong
home rule immunity that complicates the debate. Arizona’s
home rule amendment allows any city of more than 3500 people
to “frame a charter for its own government consistent with, and
subject to, the Constitution and the laws of the state.” 196 As
noted in Part I,197 courts have held that “[t]he purpose of the
home rule charter provision . . . was to render the cities adopting
such charter provisions as nearly independent of state legislation as was possible.” 198 This emphasis on municipal protections
was further articulated with respect to municipal elections in
City of Tucson v. State. 199 In that case, the Supreme Court of
Arizona looked at the language not just of the Arizona constitution allowing for home rule charters, but the language of the
city’s charter as well, which provided that “[t]he provisions of the
general laws of the State of Arizona, governing the elections of
state and county officers, not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Charter, shall govern the said elections.” 200 It then held that
preemptive state statutes aimed at displacing the city’s election
laws did not fall into this category of “general laws.” 201 Thus, the
court found that the combination of: (1) a clear legislative intent
to generally give cities autonomous power; (2) the unique, and
thus local, nature of each city’s election procedures; and (3) the
lack of a preference for a statewide scheme from state legislature
rendered, at least in the field of local elections, certain city ordinances immune from state interference. 202
Rather than presuming that the Hunter model dictates the
interaction between state and locality, decisions like City of Tucson read the state’s home rule amendment as starting from the
proposition that the state cannot meddle with local affairs. By
creating an original intent in the state constitution that favors
city power, this new default nullifies preemptive measures that
do not sufficiently demonstrate a strong state interest before the
196. ARIZ. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
197. See supra Part I.D.2.a.
198. City of Tucson v. Walker, 135 P.2d 223, 226 (Ariz. 1943) (quoting Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 2 N.W.2d 613, 614–15 (Neb. 1942)).
199. City of Tucson v. State, 273 P.3d 624 (Ariz. 2012).
200. TUCSON, ARIZ., CHARTER Ch. XVI, § 7 (emphasis added); City of Tucson,
273 P.3d at 629.
201. City of Tucson, 273 P.3d at 629.
202. See id. at 632.
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ordinance in question is preempted. As discussed below, this deference reduces the headwinds cities face in order to pass local
laws in new areas in the future.203 The abandoning of a field of
law at the state level at this point becomes more relevant to a
court than perfunctory preemptive language in a state law.
III. RECONSIDERING LOCAL POWER WHERE STATE
LAW HAS ABANDONED THE FIELD
When a home rule state abandons a field of law, the cases
above indicate that a court can step in and interpret an issue as
a local concern in ways that the original home rulers may have
not contemplated.204 This Part reexamines the legal challenges
in each of the states discussed, and highlights the relevant factors that might lead to an outcome favoring greater protection
from state interference. Section A revisits the litigation in North
Carolina, and considers how, even with strong initiative statutory grants, the lack of home rule sets a baseline for the potency
of state preemption. Section B analyzes the recent court decisions in Minnesota and the extent to which permissive home rule
language can allow courts to eschew concerns that the given area
might encroach on an area of law traditionally reserved for
statewide regulation. Section C applies these principles to the
preemptive legislation in Arizona and argues that the clear abdication of any legitimate state interest likely makes recent state
preemption laws untenable in a home rule state. Section D uses
these examples to discuss the model of local power that courts
should consider going forward in home rule states. Ultimately,
this Part concludes that the combination of permissive home rule
amendments and an abdication of legitimate state interest in a
particular area of law has given courts the incentive to recalibrate traditional limits of local power. It further argues that
courts in home rule states should adopt a rebuttable presumption to review state preemption in an abandoned field of law, and
consider allowing city ordinances to operate in that field barring
a demonstration of legitimate statewide concern.

203. See infra Part III.C.
204. See supra Part II.B.
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A. NORTH CAROLINA AND THE PROBLEM OF PREEMPTION
WITHOUT HOME RULE
As set forth in Part II, the North Carolina constitution does
not contain a home rule provision. 205 While state laws have to
some extent given the municipalities of North Carolina broad initiative power, 206 the lack of home rule there indicates a strong
legislative intent to specifically not confer special spheres of
power protected from state interference. And while cases like
Homebuilder’s Ass’n push back on the notion that North Carolina is purely governed by the tenets of Dillon’s Rule, 207 even
broad statutory grants of initiative authority leave municipalities relatively beholden to the state creature model.
The limited litigation over HB2 confirms just how important
the presence of a home rule amendment is for municipal protection, even if there are other schemes in place that confer local
power expansively. In the fight over the original bathroom bill,
there seemed to be little dispute that the preemptive language
of HB2 definitively ruled out invoking arguments of local autonomy. Indeed, the main challenges to the bill were based not on
whether the state could preempt the city on that issue, but rather whether the state law itself violated federal law. 208 The
strong preemptive language of HB2 focused on the state proclaiming that it was “protect[ing] and safeguard[ing] the right
and opportunity of all individuals within the State to enjoy
equally . . . public accommodation free of discrimination,” and
that the “regulation of discriminatory practices in places of public accommodation is properly an issue of general, statewide concern” as a result.209 Invoking public concern harkened back to
the statute granting broad local powers, which required that local legislation be “not contrary to State or federal law or to the
public policy of this State.” 210 This rationale allowed the state
legislature to “supersede and preempt any ordinance, regulation,

205. See supra Part II.B.1.
206. See supra notes 146–53 and accompanying text.
207. See Homebuilder ’s Ass’n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d
45, 50 (N.C. 1994).
208. See Complaint at 1–2, United States v. North Carolina, No. 1:16-cv-425
(M.D.N.C. May 10, 2016) (raising questions of whether HB2 violates federal law,
but not disputing whether the state law controls over Charlotte Ordinance No.
7056).
209. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-422.11 (West 2016).
210. Id. § 160A-4 (emphasis added).
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resolution, or policy adopted or imposed by a unit of local government or other political subdivision of the State” through HB2. 211
While the substantive policy of HB2 was completely repealed
with the passing of HB142, the strong preemptive language has
been replaced with something just as forceful. Indeed, even the
title of the new provision, “Preemption of Regulation of Access to
Multiple Occupancy Restrooms,” makes clear that the state legislature is now (and perhaps always was) concerned mostly with
blocking progressive social policy at the local level.
As discussed below, 212 simply asserting that an issue is of
statewide concern does not appear to be enough to make it so,
unless home rule does not govern municipal affairs, as is the case
in North Carolina. If no home rule amendment is in place to confer power on a municipality, courts are less likely to look for any
intent or legitimate statewide concern claimed by a state legislature, or to give a locality any more autonomous powers than
those explicitly outlined. For North Carolina, perfunctory
preemption language not based on actual findings on a particular issue, but which labels an issue as a general statewide concern, is likely sufficient to totally preempt local legislation. Even
arguments that purely social issues such as LGBT rights are sufficiently within a municipality’s powers granted under state law
are likely to become moot in the face of clear preemptive intent. 213
B. MINNESOTA AND THE ROLE OF PERMISSIVE HOME RULE
AMENDMENTS IN DEFINING LOCAL CONCERN
Minnesota’s home rule provisions portend a much more positive outlook for future challenges to local legislation in home
rule states. Unlike North Carolina, Minnesota has broad grants
of home rule authority; simply the act of allowing “[a]ny local
government unit when authorized by law [to] adopt a home rule
charter for its government” 214 suggests a presumption in Minnesota that home rule cities should have a certain amount of protection from state interference. This deference is reflected in
precedent broadly construing home rule authority to “embrace[]
any subject appropriate to the orderly conduct of municipal affairs.” 215 With such interpretations in place, it is less likely that
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. § 143-422.11.
See infra Parts III.B, III.C.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-4; see also supra note 144.
MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 4.
Markley v. City of St. Paul, 172 N.W. 215, 216 (Minn. 1919).
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an ordinance will be subject to scrutiny if it attempts to chart
new territory for local concern, because courts will understand
that the state legislature intended its cities to have flexibility
when the home rule amendments were passed. 216
The issue of where Minnesota courts should draw the distinction between local and statewide concern was largely obviated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Vasseur. 217 While acknowledging that the “all local municipal functions” clause of
section 410.07 “may be broad” in the relevant subject matters it
could encompass, the Supreme Court felt it sufficient to resolve
the issue on the extent to which the charter had conferred legislative authority in a structural sense to its citizens. 218 But in so
doing, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Vasseur at
least allowed for the possibility that traditional social issues like
the minimum wage conceivably serve a local municipal function.
The district court ruling was primarily concerned with defining
the outer limit of an acceptable piece of local legislation, regardless of its form, 219 and the higher court was content to settle the
matter on a threshold issue. Had the Minnesota Supreme Court
addressed the district court’s findings more directly, it likely
would have had to reconcile Vasseur with its first case involving
section 410.07, which held that the power delegated to the cities
in Minnesota allows a city to “embrace[] any subject appropriate
to the orderly conduct of municipal affairs.” 220 Instead, the
Vasseur court framed the reach of local power as a question of
216. Cf. Order Granting Petition, Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, No. 27-CV16-11794 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 22, 2016) (declining to analyze whether the state
minimum wage laws preempt the proposed charter amendment in any way).
217. Vasseur v. City of Minneapolis, 887 N.W.2d 467 (Minn. 2016).
218. See id. at 470–72.
219. See Order Granting Petition at 6, Vasseur, No. 27-CV-16-11794 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 22, 2016) (“ This dispute centers upon what can be the subject of
a charter amendment.”).
220. Markley, 172 N.W. at 216. But see Vasseur, 887 N.W.2d at 473. The
Markley decision was concerned with whether a charter amendment providing
for municipal employees to receive workers’ compensation was still enforceable
in light of a more recent state statute on the same subject. The Minnesota Supreme Court tried to distinguish the proposed amendment in Vasseur from Markley on the grounds that the new proposed amendment governed the relations
“to which the municipality is not a party.” Id. But, as the district court noted in
its ruling, the Minneapolis Charter actually governs many issues between private citizens that still rationally fall under the umbrella of a municipal function,
including rules regarding alcohol consumption. See Order Granting Petition at
11–12, Vasseur, No. 27-CV-16-11794 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 22, 2016) (citing MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CITY CHARTER § 4.1(f )). Even the Supreme Court’s passing
attempt at circumscribing local rule to certain subject matters, therefore, will
likely be subject to future scrutiny.
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form, and left the question of acceptable subjects of home rule
open to further interpretation. 221
Permissive home rule language certainly still matters when
there are alleged conflicts with state law. In those cases, Minnesota courts have preferred that the state adhere to explicit terms
when attempting to overturn a local ordinance.222 The district
court decision in Bicking illustrates the extent to which strong
and pervasive preemption influences a court to decide against a
city. 223 If such language is not present, however, Bicking and
Vasseur suggest that courts are more likely to recognize how an
ordinance and state law might coexist, even if they discuss the
same issue. In Vasseur, there was never a question as to whether
there was a state law governing minimum wage. 224 In cases like
Living Wage, this would potentially be enough to rule out the
existence of minimum wage law at the local level outright. 225 But
in Minnesota, and states with similar home rule amendments,
stronger implied delegations of local power allow instead for
courts to start from the presumption that local interests can govern a wide range of subjects conceivably tied to the proper governance of a locality, such as promoting general welfare through
increased minimum wages. Courts then require an explicit and
deliberate indication from the state that it (1) either intends to
occupy the field of law at issue; or (2) has at minimum passed a
state law that is incompatible with the ordinance at issue. Where
a state has not indicated a strong interest through an affirmative
policy, or otherwise appears to be passing a preemptive law in a
retaliatory manner, courts should recognize that abdication as
an opportunity to expand the understanding of boundaries at
which home rule cities can operate.

221. Vasseur, 887 N.W.2d at 472.
222. See, e.g., State v. Dailey, 169 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Minn. 1969) (rejecting
the notion that, regarding prohibitions against prostitution, “the legislature
contemplates its own regulation to exclude municipal regulation, without most
clear manifestation of such intent”).
223. See Order Dismissing Petition at 5–10, Bicking v. City of Minneapolis,
No. 27-CV-16-11839 (Dist. Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016) (outlining the various ways
in which the proposed charter amendment is preempted, and the strength of the
statutory language that does so).
224. See Order Granting Petition, Vasseur, No. 27-CV-16-11794 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. Aug. 22, 2016).
225. See New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans,
825 So. 2d 1098 (La. 2002); see also supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
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C. ARIZONA AND ABDICATION OF LEGITIMATE STATE PURPOSE
As discussed above, cities in Arizona often face deliberate
challenges to their ability to pass local laws, but they also enjoy
heightened home rule immunity that other states do not. 226
Cases like City of Tucson v. State demonstrate, furthermore, that
Arizona courts are willing to rule in favor of cities facing preemptive measures in certain situations.227 In general, having a permissive home rule may not be enough to fully overcome attempts
at preemption. 228 However, case law addressing preemption issues in Arizona recognizes that declarations of statewide interest cannot summarily snuff out local ordinances originally intended to be “as nearly independent of state legislation as
. . . possible.” 229 In the context of potential legal challenges to the
more recent brand of preemptive state laws, such interpretations
bode well for arguments that emphasize the importance of existing local control at the time of preemption, even where that
preemptive intent is overt.
In City of Tucson v. State, the state was careful to distinguish its attempt at preemption from prior holdings that protected local control over elections. 230 The state argued that the
inclusion of specific language in the statute citing a need to govern local elections uniformly was sufficient to justify the conclusion that “the conduct of elections . . . is a matter of statewide
concern.” 231 The court found that this statutory language was
not dispositive.232 Because the state’s home rule charter was
clear in its intention to confer inherently local issues to cities,
the mere inclusion of this perfunctory preemptive language was
not enough to overcome previously recognized home rule immunity. 233 Even the inclusion of special language pointing to “findings [made] by the legislature” was insufficient to override the

226. See supra Part II.B.3.
227. See City of Tucson v. State, 273 P.3d 624, 630–31 (Ariz. 2012).
228. See Order Dismissing Petition at 5–6, Bicking, No. 27-CV-16-11839
(Dist. Ct. Minn. Aug. 22, 2016); Vasseur 887 N.W.2d at 474.
229. City of Tucson v. Walker, 135 P.2d 223, 226 (Ariz. 1943) (quoting Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 2 N.W.2d 613, 614–15 (Neb. 1942)).
230. See City of Tucson v. State, 273 P.3d at 629.
231. Id. at 630.
232. See id.
233. Id.
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presumption toward favoring the city’s autonomy under Arizona’s home rule amendment. 234 Using tactics similar to those
used by the drafters of HB2 in North Carolina,235 here state legislators attempted to graft claims of statewide concern to the
preemptive statute without any demonstration that this was the
case, and only in response to a city action in a particular area of
law. Unlike North Carolina, however, courts in Arizona have recognized a constitutional presumption in favor of local authority
that rejects the tenets of Dillon’s Rule. 236 And while the decision
in City of Tucson focused on a narrow area of state law—the
structuring of local governments through elections—the court’s
willingness to flatly reject the state’s superficial claims of
statewide concern indicates that more is needed from a state to
preempt local issues.
Arizona state legislators’ more recent attempts to undermine local action make similar claims that certain fields are suddenly of general concern. But the state, in passing both the energy benchmarking bill, as well as SB1487, only attempted to
demonstrate a statewide interest in passing the laws after the
local ordinance attempts to fill a legislative void. In the case of
the energy bill, the Arizona legislature appears to have abdicated any interest in legislating on issues of energy usage. 237 Its
claim, therefore, that “small businesses are particularly sensitive to costs and expenses incurred in complying with regulatory
actions of a city or town,” as a justification for complete prohibition of any local regulation, rings hollow in that context. 238 Furthermore, the state law governing the destruction of confiscated
firearms only came eight years after Tucson had passed its own
ordinance on the issue and been engaged in regulation at the local level. 239 Such retroactive measures call into question the extent to which home rule can push back against statewide concern
that appears as concerned with undermining city action as occupying a field for statewide regulation.
234. See id. (“Although we respect findings by the legislature, whether state
law prevails over conflicting charter provisions under Article 13, Section 2 is a
question of constitutional interpretation.”).
235. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-422.11 (West 2016) (citing the need to
“protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all individuals within the
State to enjoy fully and equally” the fields being preempted, thus labeling them
“statewide” concerns).
236. See ARIZ. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
237. See supra note 5.
238. H.R. 2444, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2016).
239. See supra notes 190–95 and accompanying text.
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All of these preemptive laws are likely at odds with City of
Tucson v. State for two important reasons. First, building off the
understanding from Minnesota’s home rule regarding the types
of subject matter that can be contemplated as local issues,240 as
well as Arizona precedent that recognizes the intent to create
“independent” localities through the charter provision, 241 it can
certainly be argued that regulation of areas ranging from gun
safety to climate and energy regulation may be characterized as
local issues. In the recent challenge to SB1487, the city of Tucson
argued it was unlikely that the legislature had contemplated
that home rule would only extend to limited areas like elections
and real property. 242 Therefore, although the ruling in City of
Tucson dealt exclusively with the area of local elections, concluding based on that decision that home rule immunity only functions in narrow fields of law, such as municipal elections is at
odds with fluid understandings of what is required to operate a
local government.243
Second, and more importantly, the preemptive laws, especially SB1487, signal an intent to occupy potentially every field
of law, but only in a reactionary sense, after the locality has chosen to pass affirmative legislation in that area. The court in City
of Tucson v. State was skeptical of language in that case’s
preemptive statute because it did not make any showing of
statewide interest in that field beyond boilerplate language. 244
Here, too, state preemption laws that attempt to occupy a field,

240. See supra Part III.B.
241. See City of Tucson v. Walker, 135 P.2d 223, 226 (Ariz. 1943) (quoting
Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 2 N.W.2d 613, 614–15 (Neb. 1942)).
242. See Oral Argument at 25:32, State ex rel. Brnovich v. City of Tucson,
No. CV-16-0301-SA, http://supremestateaz.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
view_id=2&clip_id=2109#.
243. Climate change is a prime example of an area of law that may have once
been considered off-limits for local regulation, but has more recently seen cities
enact policies where either state or federal governments will not. Compare
Bulkeley, supra note 2 (outlining the ability of cities to address climate issues
at the local level), with Coral Davenport, Counseled by Industry, Not Staff,
E.P.A. Chief Is Off to a Blazing Start, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/07/01/us/politics/trump-epa-chief-pruitt-regulations-climate
-change.html (pointing to the federal government’s withdrawal from the field of
climate change). As this field is further abandoned at the state and federal level,
courts may recognize that climate science can be reframed as a local concern
because urban population centers have the largest numbers of people who are
affected by, and who contribute to, the harmful environmental side effects of
climate change.
244. See City of Tucson v. State, 273 P.3d 624, 630 (Ariz. 2012).
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after a city has already filled that void, will likely have to demonstrate that there is an actual state interest that goes beyond
pushing back against local power in general. This showing will
certainly be required in the case of the energy benchmarking
bill, 245 where sponsors of the state law seemed to signal that its
underlying purpose was to block city regulation in general, rather than preserve the area for implementation of a statewide
scheme. 246 In the case of SB1487, the state’s attempt to unilaterally make conclusions of law regarding conflicts between state
and local law push too far past the protective shield of home rule
immunity. It removes the role of the judiciary in interpreting the
boundaries between state and local power, 247 and it indicates a
desire to chill future local legislation by the prospect of defunding a locality based on the findings of only the Attorney General.248 Like in City of Tucson v. State, such attempts to occupy
a field either retroactively or in perpetuity restrict the reach of
home rule far more than was ever intended, and should make
courts skeptical of the constitutionality of the state’s attempt to
preempt an already-occupied field. Thus, it is through cases like
City of Tucson v. State that cities can also find an opportunity to
reframe the debate: where home rule language has been interpreted to confer broad and even independent authority on a
state’s subdivisions, a demonstrable abdication of any legitimate
state interest in a particular area of law should be sufficient to
recognize and favor home rule immunity on that issue.
D. A NEW STANDARD FOR LOCAL POWER IN ABANDONED FIELDS
The cases discussed in the preceding Sections demonstrate
the challenges cities face where a state preempts local law. They
also highlight the relevant factors courts may start examining
more carefully in determining whether those preemptive
measures should be upheld when a state has effectively abandoned a field of law. In future cases involving home rule and local
preemption, lawyers advocating on behalf of localities should
take note of permissive home rule language and the precedent
245. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.36 (2016).
246. See Dustin Gardiner, Arizona Bill Would Block Bans on Plastic Bags,
AZ CENTR. (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/
politics/2015/03/27/arizona-bill-block-bans-plastic-bags/70529702 (noting that
one of the bill’s sponsors was concerned with “economic freedom” and “individual rights” but not protection of statewide concern over the issue of energy regulation).
247. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01B.
248. See Id. § 41-194.01B1(a) (2016).
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that informs its interpretation, as well as signs of state legislatures abdicating concern for an issue at the state level, to argue
that home rule considerations outweigh the state creature model
of Hunter.249 Doing so can establish sound legal bases for either
distinguishing or overruling state laws that purport to preempt
a city ordinance, without offering a substantive policy to take its
place.
The current state of preemption law where the state has
abandoned the field is untenable and needs to be reconsidered.
The roles of cities have dramatically expanded from the days
since Dillon’s Rule and Hunter set restrictive limits on the areas
in which they could govern. As cities grow in size and significance, they need to be able to respond to the concerns of their
citizens in a meaningful way, 250 whether in areas of more purely
social interest, like civil rights, 251 or in areas that blur the line
between social concern and municipal administration, such as
minimum wage.252 Yet the current model of city-state preemption has used these outdated principles to push back against local power in a way that is based on technical statutory construction, rather than meaningful balance between state and local
power. This imbalance is most stark where state preemption is
reactive to local ordinances, and does not forward affirmative
policies as a justification. Cities are left wondering how to respond to their citizens’ concerns when their parent political bodies are unwilling to step up to the plate, and, at the same time,
are telling them they cannot fashion their own remedies.
The potential for overreach in state preemption, therefore,
warrants a new standard where the state has previously abandoned the field of law at issue. This Note proposes that, in home
rule states where the state government has abandoned a field of
law, but then attempts to preempt a local ordinance, courts
should adopt a rebuttable presumption to review whether a legitimate state interest can actually be gleaned from the statute.
Where a state can demonstrate that it is preempting an ordinance because it is attempting to implement its own statewide
scheme and thus occupy that field, courts should find that the
typical preemption analysis applies, whereby state law controls
249. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
250. See RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER: URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A
GLOBAL AGE 78–103 (arguing that the tenets of “vertical federalism” have constrained city growth and advocating for reforms to this framework).
251. See supra Part III.A.
252. See supra Part III.B.
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if it cannot coexist with the ordinance.253 But where it appears
that a state is attempting to circumvent home rule powers and
pass the preemptive statute without forwarding an affirmative
policy, courts in home rule states should presume that home rule
protections allow cities to govern in that area. This model closely
mirrors the underlying logic of City of Tucson v. State, 254 but is
likely applicable to most home rule states. A recognition, at the
state constitutional level, that local power should be protected
should be sufficient for courts to justify that: (1) local concern
can be expanded on a subject-by-subject basis; and (2) preemptive laws that restrict local power, without filling that void, are
at odds with constitutional intent. By looking toward the underlying motivations of these preemptive statutes, a more balanced
evaluation of these preemptive laws should emerge and allow
cities to govern in abandoned fields, without the chilling effects
of over-extensive state interference.
A model that redefines the limits of legislative power inevitably faces potential pitfalls. The first concern implicates the
strong legal notions of federalism that underpin the entire municipal legal regime. The Supreme Court’s holding in Hunter was
premised in large part on the need to clearly separate spheres of
power.255 A push toward expanding local power beyond the dictates of a state, then, would seem to fly in the face of the legal
wisdom organizing the relationship between city and state legislatures. It also would appear to argue in direct contradiction of
clear legal precedent holding that cities are essentially powerless
and thus subject to any expansions or restrictions of power a
state chooses to impose upon them.256
But what distinguishes these modern statutes from more
traditional instances of preemption is the lack of substantive law
underlying them. Again, the absence of any real demonstration
of intent to occupy the fields at issue creates a stronger rationale
for courts to find that preemption without an underlying state
interest is not in line with the type of top-down delegation of
power envisioned by Dillon. Furthermore, the model proposed
does not envision that courts are likely (or willing) to overrule
Dillon’s Rule in places like North Carolina, where home rule has
not been implemented in a more than de facto manner. Because
there is no constitutional recognition of local power in those
253.
254.
255.
256.

See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
273 P.3d 624 (Ariz. 2012).
See supra note 91.
See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
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states, there is no reason for a court to infer that the state ever
intended to delegate local power beyond what lies in its statutes.
In this way, the state creature model will be preserved in the
states that never abdicated that structural power. Otherwise, an
emphasis on the illusory nature of the preemptive language of
statutes in home rule states should allay fears that Hunter, or
the integrity of a state legislature’s power, is in any real danger.
The other, perhaps more important concern, is whether a
lack of affirmative policy is truly a type of legislative abandonment, and whether a presumption in favor of local power cedes
too much power in a precarious balance between state and city.
Indeed, both conservative and even more progressive home rulers were concerned with either a preservation of that traditional
role of local government, or of a rather measured expansion of
local power, because they feared that too much power at the local
level would upset the balance needed to run political bodies
larger than the cities they sought to protect. 257 Similarly, scholars of home rule have felt the need to push back against notions
that home rule should be used to champion local autonomy. 258
Therefore, modern conceptions of home rule need to be mindful
that the original theories that motivated home rule reform were
all united by the understanding that “[h]ome rule, like the state
creature concept that preceded it, was a way to structure city
power, not simply unleash it.” 259
It is true that a return to home rule immunity, and thus enhanced local power, requires measured consideration. States
that have not enacted an affirmative policy in a certain area may
still be doing so by choice, and argue that this choice not to act
does not lessen the field’s relevance to statewide concern. But
two points are relevant here. First, as noted above, the decision
to enact home rule signals, at some level, an intent to push legislation down to the local level to the extent it is possible. Therefore, if home rule amendments are to be given their true effect,
a state’s legislative choice must start at the constitutional level.
Second, the model proposed does not suppose that every instance
of legislative abandonment at the state level will result in a city
being able to effectively become autonomous in that area of law.
Rather, it emphasizes the importance of courts of law to weigh
that abandonment as a rebuttable presumption in favor of local
257. See supra Part I.D.1.
258. See GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES
STIFLE URBAN INNOVATION 35–36 (2008).
259. Id. at 38.
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power that can nevertheless be limited or restricted. A state
could pass a preemptive law not unlike the ones discussed above
as a device to challenge an ordinance, and then explain why the
decision not to occupy that area of field truly has an underlying
rationale. In other words, a recalibrated default in favor of local
power in certain situations is no more than a starting point. In
this model, then, courts will play the same role they always have
in determining boundaries between local and state concern, as
well as the legitimacy of the underlying interests in those concerns.
The benefits of this model, meanwhile, are clear. It allows
cities a renewed opportunity to enact meaningful reform and remain the laboratories of democracy that urban reformers have
always envisioned them to be. 260 In areas of law that have been
truly abandoned at the state level, cities should be allowed to
step up and attempt to resolve issues that courts have increasingly contemplated to be local in nature. 261 In the same vein, this
model also restores the role of courts in making determinations
on the reach of state constitutions, rather than relying on statutes that preempt ordinances based on their technical construction. As cities evolve, so too should the legal system’s understanding of their needs, and the ways in which the law has
already recognized that those needs should be protected. This
model strikes a balance between those needs while still allowing
for meaningful preemption when a state can demonstrate legitimate interest.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Note has been to redefine and apply
home rule immunity to modern instances of municipal legal
preemption. It advocates for a focus on the language of home rule
amendments, the underlying purpose of those amendments, and
260. See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 258, at 50–51, 143; SCHRAGGER, supra
note 250, at 255–59.
261. Recent scholarship argues that cities may be equally to blame for the
erosion of home rule’s effectiveness. See Rick Su, Have Cities Abandoned Home
Rule?, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 181, 210–13 (2017) (discussing the important role
cities play in preserving home rule through concerted and coordinated litigation). In cases like North Carolina’s bathroom bill, the seeming lack of ability or
desire to push back against overreaching state law on preemption grounds indeed demonstrates that cities must remain active players in this debate in order
for local governance to endure in any state. See discussion supra Part III.A. This
Note argues, however, that courts must remain vigilant referees in the push
and pull between states and cities in order to create a space where such legal
challenges are at least viable, if not ultimately successful.
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the extent to which a state has abandoned the preempted field
of law as a way to balance city-state relations and redefine local
power. And it proposes a standard of a rebuttable presumption
as the device by which courts can play a pivotal role in determining when state action has violated constitutionally recognized
home rule immunity.
Preemption should always be about balancing state and city
power. The current state of preemption at the local level, however, jeopardizes both the meaning of that balance, as well as the
significance of localities in a modern democracy. Over time, the
purposes of cities have been redefined; from constrained corporate entities, to recognized but ultimately subservient political
subdivisions, to modern laboratories of democracy with sophisticated structures and public policies, the trend has been toward
recalibrating the rules, decisions, and statutes that have defined
what it means to be a body of local government. Because the
needs of cities have paralleled this change, courts should recognize with more frequency that reliance on traditional rules organizing city-state relations needs to be reevaluated from time
to time. And because of the power of home rule, there is a sound
legal basis on which that realization can allow cities to regain a
modern sense of local power, and pivot toward solving modern
challenges in the face of legislative voids.

